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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FACT SYNOPSfS
This is a breach of real estate agreement, breach of fiduciafy duty and fraud case.
Plaintiffs-Respondents are Darren Kuhn ("Kuhn") and Roger and Frances Schei and their company
Schei Development Corporation ("Scheis"), referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs."
~ ~ ~ e l l are
& tKelly
s Fisher, broker ("Fisher"), Todd Bohn, agent ("Bohn"), John Merzlock,
agent ("Merzlock"), and Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc. ("Coldwell Banker").
The jury trial of this case began January 7, 2003 resulting in a Plaintiffs' jury verdict on
Saturday, February 1,2003. Despite numerous witness and exhibits Appellants' Brief cites zero trial
evidence facts or exhibits in its two-page "Statement of the Case" while asking this Court to reverse
that verdict. Appellants' Brief, pp. 1-2.
The nucleus of this case is the purchase by the Kuhns' of a new "spec" home from the Scheis
and the trade-in of the Kuhns' existing home towards that new home purchase. The evidence of
Defendants' calculated wrongdoing in deceiving and taking advantage of the Plaintiffs was
overwhelming . Most central facts were not genuinely in dispute. Defendants' own "expert"
admitted the Defendants' conduct was "outrageous."
The overall transaction was replete with wrongdoing: altered and "whited-out" transaction
documents (Tr 2937Z20-2938:8; 254:16-IS), knowing and repeated misrepresentations, illegal
"double" and "triple contracting" as between the parties, the lender, and the closing title company,
backdated documents (Exhibits 11, I I A , I I B , I I C , 23 & 23A; Tr 496:5-11; 497~13-16
(Merzlock); Tr 1170:l-6 (Fisher)), furnishing the lender an old and superceded sales agreement

Darren and Jacqueline Kuhn divorced in 1999after these 1997transactions and the Decree
gave Mr. Kuhn this civil claim. Tr 1348:14-1349:19 (Kuhn)

-
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represented as the current agreement (Tr 498~3-8(Merzlock); Exhibit 6 cf. Exhibit II),
undisclosed and unauthorized signing of an "Apartment Lease" with an outside entity in Mr. Kuhn's
name (Exhibit 7), a secret unauthorized appraisal to "bump up" the price as determined by an agreed
common appraiser (Exhibits 50A & 307), assuring the elderly Scheis that there was no risk to them
accepting the Kuhn home on trade since Defendants had anxious buyers for it (Tr 1848~15-1849:8;
1862:17-25; 1948:lO-13 (Roger Schei))when in fact they had none but still claimed a sales

commission on that trade in recording a deed of trust lien against the home (Tr 186:7-1905;
Exhibit 22). In the end, Defendants allowed the Kuhns' home to go into foreclosure, and he lost

it and ended up with a foreclosure deficiency. Exhibits 42'48'54%The Scheis lost their retirement
monies and never got the trade-in house.
The jury deliberated for two days and rendered its Special Verdict. A review of that Special
Verdict reflects the conscientious quality of that jury. CR. 307-313.
DETAILED STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence at trial was overwhelming that the Defendants repeatedly breached their
fiduciary, statutory, and contract duties, knowingly deceiving the Kuhns and Scheis and taking
advantage while being indifferent to the consequences on those two families. These are the facts:
Kuhns had a recent prior business relationship with Coldwell Banker as a result of buying a new
home at 712 Mountain Park two years prior. Exhibit 2, page 5 and A.
Scheis had a personal and ecclesiastical relationship of trust with Defendant Merzlock.
Tr 1819:ll-20; 1830:ll-15(Roger Schei).

The Scheis used their savings to build a new "spec" home at 13235 Manning Lane, listing it for
$346,500 with MerzlocWColdwell Banker. Exhibit 1

-
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The Kuhns became interested in the new Manning Lane spec home and made a $359,000
offer subject to appraisal with their existing home in trade. Exhibit 6
Defendant Bohn falsely told the Kuhns they had to enter into an Exclusive Buyer Representation

Ageement (Exhibit 4) and pay a 6% sales commission in order to trade-in their existing home on
Mountain Park on the new Manning Lane house as "standard practice and traditional" by all real
estate firms though unable to name one. Tr 186:9-190:5(Bohn). That was false. Both Defendants
Merzlock and Fisher admitted that was neither the law, the policy, nor the "standard practice." Tr
733:20-21 (Fisher); 507:20-509:19 (Memfock).

Merzlock told Darren Kuhn the new spec home on Manning Lane appraised low - almost

$100,000 under the listing price -so DarrenKuhnrejected the purchase, telling Merzlockhe would
"not continue any further" even though he had a loan commitment from Norwest subject to an
adequate appraisal. Tr 1377:ll-1379:8; 2541:17-25(Kuhn).

In an effort to salvage the transaction, "the next day" Merzlock phoned Darren Kuhn and asked
if he would come to a meeting at Coldwell Banker to try and "work out a new arrangement," Darren
"was reluctant," but agreed to meet. Tc 1379:13-25(Kuhn).
"A day or two later" at "around nine o'clock" in the evening the Kuhns, Scheis, Bohn and

Merzlock met at the Coldwell Banker offices. Tr 1380:6-16(Kuhn).
Merzlockfalsely told the Scheis "he had a qualified buyer for their house" so all they had to do
"

was work out an agreement." Tr 1380:6-1381:8(Kuhn).
The Scheis were initially reluctant to go along with the common appraiser proposal but were

persuaded by Merzlock and Bohn promising "We already' have a buyer waiting to buy that home

All Bold and Italics have been added unless otherwise noted.

-
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[at $189,900 and] will have it sold in 90 days" plus other anxious buyers "in the wings." Tr
1948:lO-13(Roger Schei) cf. Merzlock Depo. 188:lO-189:13; Roger Schei Depo. 628.

The Scheis were assured the Kuhns' home onMountain Park could be sold for $189,900, that they
"could sell it fast" and they "had a buyer" and "a back-up buyer"; Merzlock and Todd Bohn
characterized that house as "already sold" requiring only "sixty to ninety days" to close. Tr
1848:15-1849:8; 186217-25(Roger Schei).

In that meeting Defendants Bohn and Merzlock proposed a "common appraiser" - ultimately
Robert Jones of Pocatello -to appraise both the new spec home on Manning Lane and the Kulms'
existing "trade-in" home on Mountain Park with those prices being the terms of a new sales
7-25427(Kuhn).
agreement. Tr 1381~9-12;2541:I

Additionally, the Kuhns could "move into the property subject to paying a rent until it closed" as
they had "already moved some stuff into the garage." "Addendum B gleaned in discovery reflected
that evening meeting. Tr 1381:4-20; 138322-13841(Kuhn); Exhibit 2, "Addendum B".
Deposition testimony pretrial established that Coldwell Banker in fact had no "anxious buyers,"
had never written an offer on the Mountain Park house, and had never showed the house to but one
person, an "Albert Comppolattro" or "Complitari" who "had a siding company in California" and
"didn't show up" for a follow-up "appointment" and left town without making any offer. Tr 54412; Merzlock Depo. 188:lO-189:13; Roger Schei Depo. 628.

At trial, Merzlock claimed he showed "the house many times to various people" but could not
identiijr anyone other than a divorced woman who "lived in Blackfoot" but "didn't show up for the
appointment." Tr 5441-2; 545:25; 546:3-24(Menlock).
Robert Jones, a Pocatello appraiser, was retained by Merzlock and Bohn to appraise both
properties and serve as "the determiner of the values" for two properties that were going to be sold

-
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as part of one transaction between" the Scheis and Kuhns. Tr 2116:l I-I9(Jones). Mr. Jones was
not told there had been a prior recent appraisal. Tr 2117.4-7(Jones).
The appraisals by Robert Jones valuedthe Manning Lane house at $261,000 -similar to the prior
appraisal of "about $100,000 below" the $365,000 listing price. The Mountain Park home was
valued at $177,000. Tr 2113:21-2114:7; 2117.15-17(Jones); Exhibit 50A, 150.
Merzlock concealed that Jones appraisal, Exhibit 50A, and secretly hired Wayne Harris from
Rigby, to reappraise the new home without telling the Kuhns, the Scheis or the loan broker. He lied
to Harris falsely telling him that he had "been unable to find any other appraisers to do the
appraisal." Tr 2358:17-2360:22; 2366:s-13(~ariis);2956:6-7(Fuller). Merzlock reluctantly
admitted to the jury that "all" or "any2'ofthe "twelve to thirteen" Pocatello appraisers were qualified
to appraise the Manning Lane home. Tr 637:7-19(Merzlock).
Wayne Harris was not told about the "common appraiser" agreement, and Merzlock admitted he
gave Harris the original withdrawn offer from Darren Kuhn that had the $359,000 sales price as a
"target" for his appraisal. Tr 2364:l-19; 2366:lO-17(Harris); 636:7-13(Merzlock); Exhibits 5
& 6.

Merzlock testified "I think I told him [Harris]" about the Jones appraisals.

Tr 636:7-13(Merzlock); Exhibits. 50 & 50A.

Merzlock denied hiring Harris - "I didn't retain him" - claiming he only "brought the two
parties together so that Wayne Harris would do the appraisal" for David Fuller of Mortgage
Specialists. Tr 635:lO-636:6(Merzlock).
Harris used some out-of-area "comparables" that boosted the Manning Lane appraisal $35,500
in excess of the Jones' $261,000 appraisal to $296,500. Exhibit 307.
Darren Kuhn learned only attrial what ~ e r z l o c had
k done with ~ a y n Harris
e
and that the Exhibit
11 prices were not the "common appraiser" prices. Tr 25428-17(Kuhn).

-
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Defendants then created a new sale agreement reflecting the $296,500 new home price and tradein on Mountain Park for $177,000. Exhibits I 1 and 64.
The handwriting on Exhibit 11 was Merzlock's who had also authored Exhibit 6 reciting the
$359,000 selling price. Tr 178:l-21; 179:13-16; 180:4-14(Bohn); Tr 4942-IO(Merzlock).
David Fuller, the loan broker was never told of the "common appraiser" agreement or that he was
not being given the "common appraiser" appraisals of Robert Jones. Tr 2937:20-2938:8; 2955:15.
16(Fuller); Exhibits 50 & 50A. And he "did not order the appraisal from Mr. Harris." Tr
2950:17-19; 2947:18(Fuller).

The August 18,1999 Exhibit 11 sales agreement between Kuhns and Scheis was alteredwhen
given to David Fuller to conceal the trade-in term; lines 63-64 were -"whited-out"

-"erasing"

thematerial term stating "Sellerto purchase Buyer's home locatedat 712 Mountain Park, Chubbuck,
Idaho, for $177,000." Tr 2982:16-298415; 303218-3033:15(Fuller).
The new Exhibit 11 sales agreement was altered by Merzlock again after being signed by the
Kuhns and Scheis to write-in in paragraph 5, rewriting line 64 and adding lines 65-68 to reflect an
agreement for a "wrap" of the Mountain Park home. The "wrap" addition in paragraph 5 was
"whited-out'' from the sales agreement given First American Title. Exhibit 1IB.
The Kuhns and the Scheis were then told there would have to be two closings because First
American could not do both closings:
A. Todd Bohn and John Merzlock both told me that we couldn't do
both of the transactions at First American title.
Q. Did they give you any reason for that?
A. No. - Tr 2138:1833 (Roger Schei).
In fact, First American had refused to do the closing on the Mountain Park trade-in home because

Coldwell Banker was seeking to defeat the due-on-sale clause in the underlying Deed of Trust

-
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(Exhibit 61); it was First AmericanTitle7spolicy to "not close wraps" where there were due-on-sale

clauses like the Kuhns had - a "customary type of due-on-sale clause."
Tr 3129:20-25; 3149:5-13(Small); Exhibit 5 cf. Exhibit 11; Kuhn Depo. 75:19-76:4.

First American Title closed the sale of the Manning Lane house. Coldwell Banker was paid a full
commission on the $296,500 sale price based on the deceitful appraisal Wayne Harris had done at
Merzlock's behest. Tr 31122-19 (Small); Exhibit 19.
The sale documents Defendants gave First American Title for closing were not the same as those
furnished Kuhn's loan broker; Coldwell Banker created "double" and "triple contracting" documents
using "White-Out" to not disclose the sale of the trade-in home as a lease and thus trigger the dueon-sale clause in the underlying mortgage; First American got a "completely different" contract of
sale than Exhibit 11, the true original. Exhibits 11, I I A , 116, 1 I C & 19; Tr 3124:13-24;
3135:ll-25(Small); Tr. 298216-2984:15; 303218-303315 (Fuller).

Defendants called Terry Small of First American Title to testify without disclosing to her that the
sales agreement given First American was different than the one given David Fuller, the loan broker,
whose loan she was closing in that "the entire purchase of Mountain Park was deleted from the
document" given the lender by the Defendants. Tr 3140:l-8(Small). Though called as a defense
witness, she was not given a full disclosure even after being put on the witness stand that there were
different "versions" of the Exhibit 11 sale document she closed the loan on:

Q. Nobody clued you in even up to today that apparently the lender
was given a different document than you closed on?
A. No.
Q. How does that make you feel?
A. Not very good. Tr 3140:l-3141:4(Small); See also 314210-19.
And the Exhibit 7 "Apartment Lease" was only disclosed to Ms. Small ina faxaJer the trial started;
it was never part of the closing file. Tr 3141:5-31424(Small).

-
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Incidental to the First American Title closing, Coldwell Banker recorded a deed of trust against
the Manning Lane house for $7080 -liening the home with an unearned second commission hom
the Kuhns. Exhibit 22 (Recorded 10-31-97); see also Exhibit 47.

Darren Kuhn went to

BrokerIDefendant Kelly Fisher who also said that "I was required to pay a [second] six percent
commission." Tr 1366:4-15(Kuhn), At trial Fisher admitted that was not true, a second
commission was not required to he paid on a trade-in home. Tr 732:15-23. The Deed of Trust was
released only on the eve of trial claiming it was "not worth" the hassle. Tr 269:21-25(Bohn);
Exhibit 59 (recorded 12-31-02).

The second closing took place at Professional Escrow with Defendant Ron Bitton, (Tr 1427:201428:20 (Kuhn)) who assured Kuhn that Coldwell Banker had signed the Exhibit 32 Agreement

indemnifying Kuhn against any loss if the Mountain Park home was not sold; otherwise, Kuhn
advised he would not close. Tr 1428:21-1430113. As the evidence went to the jury, Coldwell
Banker claimed it had not signed the Agreement. Exhibits 31 & 32. However, in the final
instructions and exhibits conference with the Court, Defendants' counsel was pressed by the Court
relative to whether the Apartment Agreement was signed, and counsel acknowledged having one that
was "whited out":

MR. LYONS: Your Honor, you did say it was not signed; right?
You did say the agreement sent by Bron was not signed; right?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. LYONS: I thought I heard you say that it was signed.
THE COURT: Not that I know of.
MR. LYONS: I just wanted to make sure.
THE COURT: Unless you got another document over there that we
haven't seen.
MR. LYONS: It's Whited-out. Sony. - Tr 3690I7-17

-
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Among the wrong and bizarre things at Professional Escrow was the Kuhns being required to pay
the Scheis $1400 in "taxes". Tr 31541-9(Small); 2461:8-13(Schei)
Coldwell Banker never sold the Mountain Park home, and the Scheis did not have the money to
continue making the mortgage payments, so the home went into foreclosure and Kuhn had to
ultimately pay off a deficiency judgment. Tr 1456~16-1458:l;Exhibits 42, 48 & 54.
Defendant Bohn authored a backdated "Apartment Lease" between "Absolute Property
Management for Darren Kuhn" and "Roger Schei" that was "one hundred percent" in Bohn's own
"handwriting except for the preprinted portions" that provided no "advantage" for Darren Kuhn. Tr
25416-19; 258:17-260:7(Bohn). Incredibly, Bohn even claimed he was entitled to a full 6%

commission on the full value of the house just for executing that "Apartment Lease." Tr 2728274:3(Bohn). Bohn claimed the "Apartment Lease" was really "Addendum A" to the Exhibit

11

sales agreement. However, the Exhibit 7 Apartment Lease was never disclosed to First American
Title at the closing. Tr 519:15-19(Merzlock). Defendant Coldwell Banker reluctantly admitted
there was no legitimate reason for "Absolute Property Management" or any outside entity to be
injected into the Kuhn-Schei transaction - "It could have just been them." Tr 44416-445:19
(Johnston).

Defendant Coldwell Banker's broker also admitted at trial that Defendants Merzlock, Kuhn, and
Fisher had a "mandatory" and "absolute duty" as fiduciaries to Darren Kuhn "[alt the time it
happens" to discloseto him what is contemplated and what is happening in the transaction, including
that his name has been signed by another for him. Tr 446B22-449:7(Johnston).
Defendants' own expert admitted that one of his "initial" first impressions from reading the
Defendants' depositions about which he had "serious questions" was that the documents prepared
by Defendants reflected "a sale disguised as a lease in order to avoid getting crossways with the

-
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lender on [the] Mountain Park" who had a deed of trust with a due on sale clause that they were
seeking to avoid. Tr 3395:6-3396:17(Galloway).
Through all of this, not one person at Coldwell Banker was critical:

Q. And to this day no one at Defendant Coldwell Banker, to you, has
been critical of anything that has occurred here?
A. No one has said anything to me.
Q. Has anyone at Coldwell Banker been critical of anybody for what
took place?
A. I haven't heard any criticism. - Tr 269:3-10(Bohn)
Defendant Merzlock was a principal of Coldwell Banker. Tr 433:5-7(Johnston).
Fiduciary Dutv Admitted by A11
All this occurred despite Defendants admitting -and their legal counsel not disputing that they owedfiduciaiy duties to the Plaintiffs under their "Realtor" Code of Ethics. Tr 192:8-I2
(Bohn); 476:12-477:24 (Merzlock); 868:l-6; 869:4.14; 880:l-6(Fisher).

Damages
The Kuhns and the Scheis testified at length about their damages. Tr 1447-1468(Kuhn);
1848-1862,1945-1972(Roger Schei). The jury was assisted inthe consideration of damages by

Plaintiffs' expert witness James Evenson, a professor of economics, a federal mediator, and also
holding a law degree. Tr 2176-2352(Evenson). Defendants did not call an economist.
Defendants' "Outrapcous" Conduct
Plaintiffs called Darlene Manning, as an expert witness who testified to the "outrageous"
conduct of Defendants. Mrs. Manning, a Realtor since 1976, had impeccable credentials that
included, among multiple certifications and honors: Director on the Ada County Association of
Realtors, Director on the Idaho Association of Realtors, Circle of Excellence and Honor Society,
Idaho State President of the Women's Council of Realtors, Chair of the Ada County Professional

-
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Standards and Ethics Committee, Idaho Professional Standards Committee, member of the Idaho
Professional Standards Committee, and ethics instructor for Continuing Education credit for Ethics
including Boise, Nampa, Caldwell, Coeur d'Alene, Payette. Tr 2569:6-2579:22(Manning).
Mrs. Manning testified that, based upon her review of the Defendants' depositions and
exhibits in evidence, the Defendants' conduct was "fraudulent and outrageous, with a conscious
disregard for the likely consequences of their conduct." Tr 2584:15-2585:10, 2587~122588:12(Manning). She further testified that her opinion as to outrageousness of the Defendants'

conduct was increased by the trial testimony. Tr 2592:3- 2516:16(Manning). Never inthirty years
had she reviewed a residential transaction where "there were as many violations." Tr 2590:2024(Manning).

FURTHER STANDARDS ON APPEAL
An Appellants' Briefmust specify the issue, provide legal and factual support "with citations
to the authorities, statutes andparts of the transcript andrecordrelied upon. Michalk v. Michalk,
2009 Ida. Lexis 191, * I 3 (Id. Sup. Ct. 10-20-09).

"In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to identify legal issues and
provide authorities supporting the arguments in the opening briej" Gallagher v. State, 141
ldaho 665,669, I 15 P.3d 756,760 (2005). "When the opening brief contains no authority on

an issue presented, it is immaterial that the party provides authority either in a reply brief or in
supplemental briefing because the issue had already been waived." Id.
The Court will not search the record for error. ldaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc.,
134 ldaho 738, 745,s P.3d 1204 (2000).

-
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"[Flailure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from challenging that action
on appeal." Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.3d 504, 506(2009).
"The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an action,
is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a
credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and
circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial." Giltner, lnc. v. ldaho DepY of Commerce &
Labor, 145 ldaho 415,427,179 P.3d 1071 (2008).

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantialjustice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

- Rule 61, ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT WAS OUTRAGEOUS;
I T WAS PROPER TO HAVE ALLOWED EXPERT TESTIMONY
The evidence at trial was staggering as to Defendants' calculating, dishonest, deceitful and
double-contracting and contract-altering misconduct. All parties, both parties' experts, and the
Court agreed the overall transaction was essentially what Darlene Manning testified to as an
"extremely complex" ..."the most complex real estate transaction..."ever seen" related to "residential
properties." Tr 191319-19148; 256320-256413; 2590:7; 3037:l-6(Manning).
Defendants' argue that the District Court abused its discretion in allowing the Plaintiffs'
expert witness, Darlene Manning, to testify that Defendants' "conduct was outrageous."

-
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AppellantsyBrief, p. 6-8. Appellant's Brief does not disclose to this Court that their own expert

witness, Gene Galloway, repeatedly agreed the conduct at issue was "o~trageousmand "deceitful"
and "evasive" and "gross" involving "materially altered" documents -those were his opinions after
educating himself to "both sides" of the evidence. Tr 3394:3-5; 3408:ll-22; 3409:3-5; 3428:15.
25; 3439:l-8; 34531-15; 3532:3-11; 3591:l-8(Galloway).

Defendants' lead trial counsel even acknowledged that whether the Defendants' conduct was
"outrageous" was an issue for "the jury" that focused on credibility. Tr 26631-12.

Rockefeller does not Applv
Defendants cite only to Rockefeller v. Grabow which held it was not an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to refuse to allow a real estate expert to testify to the established and statutory
standard of care. Rockerfeller#136 Idaho 637, 647,39 P.3d 577, 587.
The trial court here properly held that Rockefeller did not apply because the expert testimony
of Mrs. Manning was limited to the area of punitive damages and accordingly had:
broad discretion in the admission of evidence" including the "admission of expert
testimony. Karlson v. Harris, 140 ldaho 561, 564, 97 P.3d 428 (2004)
Defendants admit that was the delineation of her expert testimony and that she did not
"testify as to the standard of care" as that was reserved for the Court. Appellants' Brief, p. 7.

In full accord with Rockefeller, the testimony of Darlene Manning was allowed to "assist the
trier of fact" in understanding that which was "beyond the experience and education of the average
juror" relative to the extreme degree of deviation by Defendants. The trial court ruled that "due to
the nature and complexity of this transaction, it would be helpful to the jury to hear expert
testimony" from Mrs. Manning. Tr 1909:4-1910:5; 256315-2564:l-13.

-
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The district court understood the law and acted within the limits of its discretion in allowing
Mrs. Manning to assist the trier of fact in testifying as to the "outrageous" conduct:
THE COURT: ...in this case the specialized knowledge of this expert, I believe, will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine, maybe, a fact in
issue here.
Now, there has already been testimony this is the most complex real estate
transaction some other experts have ever been involved with. There has been this
subject brought up by the defendants of limited dual agents, and I just think that this
testimony will or could -- because I'm not sure what it's going to be -- assist the
jurors in making the decision.
She does not and will not be called, Mr. Hawkes, to state the agents -- all the
defendants owed all the plaintiffs a duty of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing
because that's the standard in Idaho and that's not an issue, and the Court is going to
instruct the jury on that. Tr 2563:20-2564:13

The Testimonv Was P r o ~ e As
r to Punitive Damaees
The testimony of Mrs. Manning was an "appropriate factor" as to punitive damages.
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 ldaho 211, 215, 923 P.2d 456(1996). One

familiar with customary practices will assist the trier of fact determine an "extreme deviation":
"The determination of what will be of assistance to the trier of fact lies within the
broad discretion of the trial court. The record affords evidence that Mr. Greene was
a qualified safety engineer and was familiar with customary practices in the
consumer products industry. His testimony as to ALCOA's "extreme deviation"
from these customarypractices was relevant to the issue ofpunitive damages. Mr.
Greene's learned opinion arguably assisted the less knowledgeable triers offact in
determining whether ALCOA acted in extreme deviation from reasonable standards
of conduct." Sliman v. Aluminum Co. ofAm., 112 ldaho 277, 285-286, 731
P.2d 1267 (1986).

Defendants' Own Expert Testified as to the Outrageous Conduct of Defendants
"In the case of an incorrect d i n g regarding evidence, a new trial is merited only if the error
affects a substantialright of one of the parties." Karlson v. Hamis, 140 ldaho 561,564,97 P.3d
428 (2004)(referencingI.R.C.P. 61; I.R.E. 103). Any error in Darlene Manning's testimony

-

PLAINTIFFS'/RESPONDENTS$BRIEF
Page 18
Kuhn & Schei v. Coldwell Banker, Fisher, Bohn & Merzlock

would be harmless as Defindants'own expert, Gene Galloway went beyond what Darlene Manning
testified to without objection.
"Outrageous" - "Flat out Fraud" - "Gross"

The defense initially withheld Mr. Galloway's notes made while he read the Defendants
depositions, Exhibits 79 and 80. Among other things he testified to "serious questions" about
"breaches of substantial duties" (Tr 3386:20-24), that the Defendants were "either feigning
ignorance or stupid or plain dumb" (Tr 33931-8), was "flat out fraud" and "outrageous" (Tr
3394:l-5; 3408:22; 3409:5; 3532:3-If), creating transaction documents of "a sale disguised as

a lease in order to avoid getting crossways with the lender on Mountain Park" (Tr 3395:l-13),
materially altering and "whiting-out" documents (Tr 3580:l-3581:8), creating an "unrecorded
Wananly Deed" (Tr 3396:l-14), failing vigilance after being "alerted to wrongdoing" by Todd

Bohn (Tr 3409-3410:1), engaging in prohibited "double contracting" and "deceitful double
contracting" by creating documents that were a "sale disguised as a lease" (Tr 3412:l-19; 3413125; 34221-15), breaching fiduciary duties by not making "full and complete disclosure" (Tr

34131-15), keeping silent when the Exhibit 11 transaction was altered asking "Why wasn't the
transaction stopped?" (Tr 3418:l-22), defied professionalism (Tr 34233-23) 'The transaction
ended up in a place it should not have gone if they had been performing in a professional
manner, none of this would have happened"; Tr 3428:15- 16 "And if he doesn't understand it, he
needed professional help."), being evasive (Tr 3428:24-3429:8 "Todd is evasive...Todd is being
"Why would documents be back-dated?"),
evasive"), backdatingtransactiondocuments(Tr 3437~19
gross stupidity (Tr 3439:l-8), not credible (Tr 3440:14; 3441:2 "What the hell kind of agent is
this?").

-
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Those admissions that Defendants "had been outrageous in their conduct were his
immediate, initial impressions ajer reading all depositions. Tr 3452:4-14(Galloway).
"Outrageous" Conduct was an Admitted Jury Ouestion
Defense counsel recognized in his examination of Darlene Manning that, depending on
"which version" of the facts the jury believed, they could conclude from her testimony that the
conduct of the Defendants was "outrageous":
Q. So it all depends on which version the juiy tend to believe?
A. That's correct.
Q. So all you're doing today is saying in each of these assumptions
that Mr. Hawkes gave you, i f you accept the plaintiffs' version,
that's outrageous conduct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And ifyou accept the defendants' version, it's not outrageous
conduct?
A. That's correct.
Tr 2662:2-12 (Darlene Manning Cross-exam by Mr. Nye)

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO GO
TO THE JURY; THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IS PROPER
Defendants redundantly argue that the Court erred in "allowing Kuhn and Sheis to move
forward with their punitive damages claims and that the amount awarded by the jury was
unconscionable." Appellants' Brief, p. 8.
Defendants argue without citing to a single fact in the record, that "The evidence set forth
in the trial of this matter did not establish such deviant behavior as to allow a claim for punitive
damages to proceed" claiming "no real evidence of fraud and certainly nothing that could rise to the
level of clear and convincing evidence." AppellantsrBrief; pp. 9-10.

-
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Besides ignoring Defedants' own experts' damning testimony, this factless/citationless
argument is insufficient as amatter of law. Rule 35(a)(6), IAR. This argument is waived for failing
to provide citation to the record supporting the argument; it cannot be cured in a reply brief.
Gallagher v. State, 141 ldaho 665,669, 115 P.3d 756,760 (2005).

As stated in POINT ONE above both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' experts testified
Defendants' conduct was "outrageous." And all Defense counsel even stipulated at the instructions
conference to inclusion of the word "outrageous" along with the word "wantonness" in Jury
Instruction 45A. Tr 368325.3686. Defendants' argument on Appeal is moot:
In determining whether there was a"reasonab1e likelihoos' that an award of punitive
damages could be supported, arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence
are moot when a properly-instructedjury returned an award of punitive damages. Hall v. Fanners Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 145 ldaho 313, 319,
I 7 9 P.3d 276 (2008)

Defendants do not appeal any objectionable "punitive damages" jury instruction. Based upon

lIall the award of punitive damages moots Defendants' argument. See Tr 3689-3703.
The Amounts Awarded Were Reasonable
Defendants argue "the excessiveness of the punitive damages award requires a remand"
noting "to determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive, the Court must ascertain
whether the punitive damage award appears to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice" with onefactor being "proportionality". Appellant's Brief, p. 10 (citing Oriff, Inc.
v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 ldaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441; 448 (2003)).

Defendants focus only on the "proportionality" in Gr@ Defendants argue in the abstract that
Kuhn's punitive damages were 3 10% of the compensatory award and the Scheis' punitive damages
were 430% of the compensatory award. Appellants' Brief, p. 10.

-
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That incomplete argument says nothing. Ln Wblstonv. Monumental Life Insurance Co., 129
Idaho 21 1,923 P.2d 456 (1996), a punitive to compensatory damage "ratio of just under 26 to 1" or
2600% was affirmed. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 ldaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004),
affirmed a punitive damage award of $300,000 with nominal damages of $735, or 40,816% of what
was affirmed. Defendants' singular focus on "proportionality" fails.
Defendants also make an argument unsupported by any citation to law of comparing net
income against thepunitive award and then arguing it is disproportionate. Appellants1Brief, p.
10. The argument is waived and cannot be cured by citations in a Reply Brief. Gallagher v. Stater
141 ldaho 665,669,115 P.3d 756,760 (2005).

Defendantsattempt to compare Todd Bohn's home sale "net income" 1998 of $12,180, from
1999 of $13,883, and from 2000 of $18,382 against the punitive damages against him of $63,750

and claim punitive damages is more than his net i n ~ o m e Defendants
.~
ignore the contrary evidence
from Todd Bohn that while in Pocatello his gross income ranged from $12,000 to $150,000. Bohn
Depo. 98:17-19.

Defendants claim Merzlock's "net income" from all sources was less than $75,000 per year,
citing Tr 3631:15-16. They contrast this against punitive damages of $58,373 without other
support. Appellants' Brief, p. 11. This unsupported argument is waived. IAR 35(a)(6).

Defendants' argument ignores Bohn's gross income in 1998 for home sales alone was
$43,694, for 1999was $47,636, and for2000 was $52,760. Exhibit 65. These gross income figures are then
reduced by things such as "car and tmck expense" for each year ranging from $15,275 to $19,500 each year,
making his auto expense greater than his claimed net income. Id. Mr. Bohn's total gross income for sales
of homes for the three years is $144,090. The punitive damage award against him is 44.24%. Grzx Inc. v.
Curiy Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315,322,63 P.3d 441 (2003) discusses proportionality as relates to total
assets -not yearly net income. Defendants do not cite to the amount of Defendant Bohn's assets.

-
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It is rather brazen to argue to this Court what Mr. Merzlock's "net income" was when he had
not evenfiled tax returns for seven years and provided no independent verification of the "whitedout" documents he furnished for that income claim:
Q. Did you furnish any tax returns?
A. I didn't.
Q. Have you filed tax returns in the lastfour years?
A. I havent4
Q. Are the documents you have furnished copies -- in some case, documents that
have obvious whiteout on them?
A. Yes.

***

Q. Do you have information that you've also furnished to us from which we can
verify from an independent source the accuracy of the figures you put into that
document?
A. No.
Tr 2797:3-2798:17

-

Cross-examination belied Merzlock's $75,000 claim, establishing that in 2002 he made
$142,820 on appraisals alone, plus income from his rental properties, building ownership, and
business ownership. Tr 3631:17-21; 3637:21-3638:12.
Finally, Defendants claim the net income of Coldwell Banker Landmark to be $138,770 for
1997-1999. Appellants' Brief, p. 11. Defendants would have this Court ignore the evidence that
Coldwell Banker had gross income of $1,827,015; $1,804,632; and $1,330,846 in those same three
years. Exhibit 65.
Defendants Ivnore Several Other GriffFactors

While Defendants focus entirely on "proportionality" of punitive damages, Defendants ignore
other factors including "the prospective deterrent effect of such an award upon persons situated

similarly," "motivesactuating the defendant'sconduct, the degree of calculation involved" and "the

When Mr. Merzlock next took the stand he had to admit that in fact he had not filed tax
returns in the prior seven years -since 1994. Tr 3627:20-21(Merrlock).

-
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extent of the defendant's disregard of the rights of others." Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc.,
138 ldaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441, 448 (2003). Defendants failed to address these factors.

"Proportionality" is not conclusive:
Contrary to the position taken by Workmen's Auto, the relationship between the
jury's award of punitive damages and its award of other damages is not conclusive
on the issue of whether punitive damages are excessive. Instead, "the true basis for
an award of one amount of punitive damages as opposed to another amount lies in
an overall appraisal of the circumstances of the case."

- Myers v. Workmen's Auto 140 ldaho 495, 506-507, 95 P.3d 977 (2004)

The Court should consider the "prospective deterrent effect of such an award upon" realtors
and brokers situated similarly to the defendants, as stated in Griff;
Bonded warehousemen hold positions of trust and confidence. They store valuable
commodities and they facilitate agribusiness, an important aspect of Idaho's
economy, and it is important that bonded warehousemen remain trustworthy. Oriff,
Inc. v. Cuny Bean Co. 138 ldaho 315,322,63 P.3d 441,448 (2003)

So, too, realtors and real estate companies "hold positions of trust and c ~ ~ d e n c e . "
Defendants' overreaching and deceitful motives must also be taken into account. Id.
The degree of calculation of Defendants' "outrageous" conduct must be taken into account
as well as the "extentof the defendant's disregard of the rights of others." Defendants' outrageous
conduct and deceit was not limited to just the Plaintiffs but included dishonesty also to First
American Title Company, the lender, the loan broker, and "bump-up" appraiser.

The Award Does not Violate the Due Process Clause
Finally, Defendants argue that the "Due Process Clause prohibits the imposition of grossly
excessive or arbitrary punishment." Appellants' Brlef, p. 11. Appellants argue there are three
"guideposts" to consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
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penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Appellants' Brief, p. I 1 (citing State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,418 (2003))

Guidepost 1 -Phvsieal Iniury Is not Required
As to the frst "guidepost," Defendants concede that Defendants' "conduct, as found by the
jury, may have resulted from intentional conduct." Appellants Brief, p. 12. Defendants then argue
they should not be subject to punitive damages because that intentional conduct and "harm" to
Darren Kuhn and the Scheis "was economic rather than physical" and did not impact upon "the
health or safety of others." Id. But Physical harm is no threshold to the imposition of punitive
damages, and Defendants' case State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,418
(2003) had no such threshold requirement.

This Court instead has affirmatively stated that "The determination ofwhether aparty should
be permitted to assert a claim for punitive damages is not based upon the type of case or claim.
Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, I 4 6 Idaho 118,123,191 P.3d 196 (2008).

A review of afJmed punitive damages awards cases by this Court reflects that the vast
majority of those damages awards arise out ofnon-physical economic injury: Rockefeller v. Grabow,
136Idaho 637,39 P.3d 577 (200l)(realtoribroker breachof fiduciary duty); Hallv. FarmersAlliance

Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 179 P.3d 276 (2008)(breach of insurance contract); Myers v.
Workmen'sAuto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,95 P.3d 977 (2004) (breach of insurance contract); Cheney
v. Palos VerdesZnv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,665 P.2d 661 (1983)preach of oral contractlfraud); Boise
Dodge, Znc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902,453 P.2d 551 (1969)(fiaud); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins.
Co., 129 Idaho 21 1,923 P.2d 456 (1996)(bad faith denial of insurance benefits); Grzx Inc. v. Curry
Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315,63 P.3d 441 (2003)(fraud); Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,39 P.3d
612 (2001)(express easement); Weaver v. Staford, 134 Idaho 691,s P.3d 1234 (2000)(trespass);

-
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Highland Enters. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,986 P.2d 996 (1999)(damageto property); Student Loan
Fundv. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45,951 P.2d 1272 (1997)(defamation); Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho
763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995)(fiaudflrreach of contractJintentiona1 infliction of emotional distress by
Realtor partner); Mac Tools v. Gr@n, 126 Idaho 193,879 P.2d 1126 (1994)(fraud); Magic Valley

Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Proj'l Business Servs., 119 Idaho 558,808 P.2d 1303 (1991) (retention of
"account summaries" or "ledger cards"); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 118 Idaho 769,800
P.2d 656 (1990)(breach of insurance contract).
The reality is the multiple and repeated acts of Defendants' wrongdoing and their "trickery"
and "deceit" make them "more reprehensible" as to punitive damages:
Obviously, this case does not involve acts of violence by Farmers, which means that
Farmers' actions cannot be deemed more blameworthv on that basis. The auestion,
then, is whether Farmers' actions can be described as either acts of "trickery or
deceit" or repeated acts of misconduct. If so, then their actions were more
reprehensible. Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 322,
179 P.3d 276,285 (2008).

Defendants repeated "outrageous" misconduct as testified to by both experts and the trickery
and deceit set forth herein evidence "more blameworthy" conduct under "Guidepost 1."
Guidepost 2 -The Disparitv Between Actual Harm and Punitive Damages
The second guidepost is "the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award." State Farm, 538 U.S. 408,418 (2003)
Defendants claim that Kuhn's ratio of "compensatory damages to punitive damages" o f 3.1
to 1" and Scheis of "4.3 to I" to be outside the "limits of due process due to the substantial nature
of the compensatory damages." Appellants1Brief, p. 13.
Defendants' conclusion ignores "there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages
award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due

-
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process where precise awards in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and

circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to theplaintiff." State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). "Single-digit multipliers are more likely to

comport with due process." Id.
There is nothingper se impermissible for these single-digit multipliers. Defendants' factless
claim that "for the same reasons as those analyzed" in the dicta "in Campbell, the punitive damages
in this case should be no more than the compensatory damages amounts" is unsupported.
Appellants' Brief, p. 14. For what reasons? Based on what facts? Defendants totally fail to

support that conclusion with argument and fact required by IAR 35(a)(6).
Defendants argue "[tlhe only actual damages" Coldwell Banker was "responsible for
according to the jury is the refund of the commission paid in the amount of $1 1,825.00" and
therefore punitive damages of $800,000 is 68 times the compensatory amount. Appellants9Brief,
p. 14 (citing R. 307-313). Defendants again fail to compare any facts to harm as required by them

on appeal. But also, this is a false calculation.
Coldwell Banker (aka Landmark Real Estate, Inc. dba Keller Williams Realty East Idaho)
was liable to Darren Kuhn for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in the amount of $23,250.60,
and for breach of contract of $154,419.00. CR. 868. This totals $177,669.60 against the $500,000
punitive damages award for a 1 to 2.81 ratio. Id.
Coldwell Banker was liable to Schies for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in the
amount of $41,359.80, for breach of contract $28,446.00, and for refund of real estate commission
of $1 1,825.00. CR. 869. This totals $81,630.80 against the $300,000 punitive damages award for
a I to 3.6751 ratio. CR. 868.
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These ratios comport with the previously accepted "single digit ratio" cases as discussed in

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.408,425 (2003).
Defendants Provided Zero Argument As To Guidenost Three

The third guidepost is "(3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,418 (2003). Defendantsmake no argument here contrary to Rule
35(a)(6), IAR.

POINT THREE
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Rule 59(e) -Motion Never Filed

Defendants claim the trial court erred in denying a Rule 59(e) motion, but do not point to any
such motion. Appellants' Brief, p. 14. Defendants had the burden of filing the Rule 59(e) motion
"not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the Judgment." Rule 59(e), IRCP. The Amended

Restated Judgment was entered February 5,2003. CR. 426-429. Defendants filed no Rule 59(e)
motion, only a Rule 50(b), 59(a) and Idaho Code $6-807 motion. CR. 530.
Rule 59(e) raises the question of "manifest abuse of discretion." Appellants' Brief, p. 5.
Rule 59(e) proceedings afford the trial court the opportunity to correct errors of fact or law in its
proceedings. Barmore v, Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008).
Even if such a motion had been filed, the trial court would have properly denied it.
Defendants argue counsel for Scheis made closing argument that Mr. Schei had not made a claim
for damages from Manning Lane. Appellants' Brief, p. 15. At the same time, Defendants admit
that the "arguments and remarks" of counsel are not evidence. Appellants1Brief, p. 15 (citing
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CR. 315-316); Defendants have not shown any "admission of fact" or "stipulations of fact" only

"argument" which is not binding. Defendants have taken these comments out of context as set forth
by Mr. Reece in his Affidavit, n 4 at CR. 853. The Court found the comments "were not
stipulations of fact nor were they binding." CR. 866e&f.

No Double Damages
Defendants claim "jury awarded the same [$14,875] damages twice" citing to the Third

Amended Restated Judgment. Appellants' Brief, p. 16; CR 894-897. Defendants fail to identify
anything in that ThirdAmended Restated Judgment showing any same damages awarded twice; the
sum of $14,875 does not even appear once in that document. CR 894-897. Defendants
impermissibly ask this Court to "search the record" for error. ldaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration,
Inc., 134 ldaho 738, 745, 9 P.3d 1204, 1211 (2000). Defendants failed to file a Rule 59(e)

Motion and cannot now complain. In addition, they have failed to show abuse of discretion.

The Trial Court Properlv Denied the Motion JNOV
Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their Motion JNOV claiming (1) no
evidence showed the Defendants changed documents, or lacked authority to sign the lease for Kuhn,
and (2) evidencewas insufficientto show that Defendants' conduct caused any damage. Appellants'
Brief, pp. 16-17. A Motion JNOV is denied "if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and

probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury,"
with the moving party admitting "any adverse facts. " Bates v. Seldin, 146 ldaho 772, 774-75,

There Was Evidence that These Defendants Chan~edExhibit 11
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim "the version of Exhibit 11 retained in Dave Fuller's
file and the version of Exhibit 11 retained in First American Title Company's file differed from
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[Coldwell Banker's] version of Exhibit 11." Appellants' Brief, p. 17. Terri Small of First
American testified she did not know who altered her version. Id. Defendants then admit these
different versions "could have come from one of the real estate agents, one of the plaintiffs, or it
could have come from Jacquie Kuhn." Id. This admission defeats their claim as all reasonable
inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.
There Was No Authoritv to Sign for Mr. Kuhn
Defendants argue Judgment NOV was proper because Todd Bohn had permission from
Jacquie Kuhn to sign the exhibit apartment lease for Darren Kuhn. Appellants' Brief, p. 18. Mr.
Kuhn, however, testified that he never would have given "Todd Bohn authority to create an
apartment lease" and that he did not consent to the lease nor ratify Mr. Bohn signing it. Tr 1375:913; 1376:7-12(Kuhn). Defendants cite only to stricken testimony of Todd Bohn and the Affidavit

of Jacqueline [Kuhn] Jordan claiming Mr. Kuhn's ex-wife gave Bohn authority to sign for Mr.
Kuhn. Appellants* Brief, p. 18, 25.
As to a real property lease, one spouse cannot bind the other without written permission:
The leasehold is an estate in real property. Since it belongs to the community of
plaintiff and his wife he cannot convey or encumber it without her signature and
acknowledgment. Coppedge v. Leiser, 71 ldaho 248, 251, 229 P.2d 977
(1951).

See also, ldaho Code §32-912

The was no writing to satisfy this requirement. Tr 2723:8-Il(Manning).
The Court also found Jacquie Kuhn unreliable, willing to lie and commit "perjury," and
unwilling to return to Idaho to testify in any event. CR. 866b-866c.
Plaintiffs Were Damaged
Defendants claim "there was insufficient evidence to show that Defendants' conduct caused

any damage" to Plaintiffs! Appellantsr Brief, p. 17-19. Defendants make mitigation arguments,
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on which Defendants bear the burden and provide no support. Davis v. First interstate Bank,
N.A., 115 ldaho 169,170,765 P.2d 680,681 (1988).

Causation Is for the Jury
Contrary to Defendants' argument there is substantial evidence to support Plaintiffs' claims
of damage. And the "factual issue of causation is for the jury to decide." Stephens v. Steams,
106 ldaho 249, 253, 678 P.2d 41(1984). "Proximate cause can be shown from a chain of

circumstances from which the ultimate fact...is reasonably and naturally inferable." Sheridan v.
St. Luke's ReglMed. Ctr., 135 ldaho 775, 785,25 P.3d 88 (2001).

Both Darren Kuhn and the Scheis testified about the damages they incurred as aresult of the
Defendants' conduct which testimony Plaintiffs' expert economist used to compute damages.
Darren Kuhn testified that he incurred damages when GMAC foreclosed on Mountain park,
was sold for only $150,000, and he incurred $6,000 in attorney fees (Tr 1456:16-1458:l; Exhibit
54); he further testified that the foreclosure caused increased interest expense for truck rental and

his mortgage and that he was unable to refinance with the wrongful deed of trust and foreclosure (Tr
1441:8-1443819; 1458:2-1460:9; Exhibits 55-56); he also had a promissory note against him (Tr
1531:7-9); and had to pay refinance charges to ultimately secure a lower interest rate. Tr 1453891454:IZ(Kuhn).

Roger Schei testified the Scheis incurred damages as a result of Mountain Park going into
foreclosure and Merzlock's misrepresentations he already had buyers lined up for Mountain Park
with assurances it would be sold for $189,900.00 within 60-90 days

.

Tr 1848:22-1849:18;

1854:18-1855:5; 1948:lO-13,21-23(Roger Schei). Merzlock's promises proved to be false when

Mountain Park went intoforeclosure, the Scheis lost their anticipated profit on Mountain Park of
approximately $40,000.00. Tr 1945:12-1946:7 (Roger Schei). The Scheis suffered damage to
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their credit rating thus, precluding their ability to obtain the loans necessary to operate their business.
Tr 1949:l-1958:24(Roger Schei). Merzlock and Bohntold Roger Schei that, sinceMountainPark

would be sold within 60 to 90 days, tlie Scheis would only need to make the mortgage payments on
that property for two or three months. Tr 186220-25(Roger Schei). Scheis ultimately paid
$27,621.OO in mortgage payments on Mountain Park and incurred maintenance costs. Tr 1961:211970:l (Roger Schei).

The Defendants' wrongs forced the Scheis to refinance their home and incur credit card debt
resulting in higher interest rates on their house and credit cards. Tr 1970:5-1971:7 (Roger Schei).
Scheis also incurred a greater tax liability. Tr 1971:15-197212 (Roger Schei).
Dr. Evenson discussed in great detail the bases for his opinion as to Kuhn's damages (Tr
2190:18-22122) and Scheis' damages (Tr 2212:19-222419). Dr. Evenson explained to the jury

his calculations of $216,433.00 - $350,190.00 in damages incurred by Kuhn (Tr 2212:3-8) and
$465,845.00 - $558,688.00 in damages incurred by the Scheis (Tr 2224:lO-13). No objection was

made to Dr. Evenson's Exhibits 68 and 69 outlining damages for both Plaintiffs. Tr 2226.3-11.
Dr. Evenson even testified to causation, to damage that "flows from the transaction" (Tr 2198:20),
"...had this not happened...."(Tr 2223:6).
Defendants' Motion JNOV was denied due to "sufficient evidence of quantity, quality, and
probative value that reasonable minds could agree with this Jury's Verdict" CR 866h.

The Trial Court Proaerlv Denied Defendants' Motion for New Trial
The Defendants contend there are "five grounds that require a new trial" including Rule
59(a),(l, 4, 7, 5, and 6). Appellants' Brief, p. 20.
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The trial court has "broad discretion" and "may weigh the evidence and credibiliq of the

witnesses" relative to a request for new trial. Oillingham Constr,, Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins
Constr., Inc,, 142 ldaho 15,23,121 P.3d 946,954 (2005). Its 'grant or denial of suchmotions

must be upheld unless the court has manifest& abused the wide discretion vested in it."' Warren
v. Sham 139 ldaho 599,602,83 P.3d 773,776 (2003).

Defendants Failed to File the Reauisite Affidavit Under Rule 59(a)(l) and (2)

A Motion for new trial must be filed within 14 days of Judgment. Rule 59(b), IRCP.
Motions for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(l), (2), (3) or (4) must be accompanied by an affidavit
served with the motion. Rule 59(a)(7);(c),IRCP. Timeliness is jurisdictional.

O'Neil v.

Schuckardt, 116 ldaho 507,510,777 P.2d 729,732 (1989).

The AmendedRestatedJudgment was entered February 5,2003 and the Motionfor New Trial
filed without affidavit on February 18,2003. CR. 529-530. The Memorandum in Support was filed
late May 5,2003 (CR. 825) the same day as the late Affidavits of Jacqueline Jordan (CR. 560-565),
Kelly Kumm (CR. 574-619), and David C. Nye (CR. 620-824).
Where "Appellant procedurally defaulted on this ground by failing to file an afkidavit to
accompany his motion for a new trial" it was proper to dismiss the motion for a new trial." Rule
59(a)(l);Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 ldaho 423,429,196 P.3d 341, 347 (2008).

Rule 59fa)ll) -There

Were No Irregularities

Defendants also claim "irregularity in the proceedings by the adverse party" under Rule
59(a)(l). Appellants' Brief, p. 20. Irregularities are "irregularities in the trial proceedings."
Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 ldaho 705, 710, 979 P.2d 107, 42 (1999).

A "district court takes into consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the jury's
decision." Schmechel v. Dille, M.D., 2009 Ida. LEXlS 197 (Id. Sup. Ct. 10-26-09).
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Defendants claim Darren Kuhn "lied about his knowledge of the Robert Jones appraisal", "hid the
location of his ex-wife from Defendants despite a direct interrogatory regarding the location of all
persons with knowledge," and "lied about his credit problems and hid documents regarding his credit
history from Defendants." Appellants9Brief, p. 20.
Defendants only cite to theuntimely Affidavit ofJacqueline Jordanandthe Affidavit ofKelly
Kumm for the proposition that Darren Kuhn knew of a Robert Jones appraisal. Appellants' Brief,
p. 21. Without reciting any specifics, Appellants' Brief improperly argues the Affidavit of Lowell

Hawkes -which disputes the Affidavit of Kelly Kumm - is "fraught with hearsay" but without
pointing to anything in the record as required by IAR35(a)(6) other than to cite to the Clerk's Record
at page 866c. Appellants' Brief, p. 21. But Page 866c does not support the argument made; it
recites Judge McDermott's "Minute Entry and Order" on May 19,2003 specifically holding that the
affidavit of Mr. Hawkes would not be stricken as it was "a response to Defendant's allegation of
fraud concerning a credit report of Darren Kuhn and Jones'Appraisal." CR 866c, lines 16-17. The
affidavit argument here is waived for failing to present any argument that cites to the "parts of the
record and transcript and record relied upon" as required by Rule 35(a)(6), IAR.
Darren Kuhn Did Not Lie
The trial court properly weighed the evidence and credibility and found "Darren Kuhn did
not have knowledge of the appraisal performed by Robert Jones on Manning Lane at the time of the
controversy between the parties herein and that Mr. Kuhn did not commit perjury re: his credit
history or any other fact." CR. 866h-i.
In claimingmanifest abuse of discretion, Defendants cite to the Affidavit of Jacqueline Kuhn
to support the argument that "Darren Kuhn lied about his credit problems and hid documents
regarding his credit history." Appellant's Brief, p. 20 (citing CR. 560-565). Defendants argue
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that the after-the-fact Affidavit of Kelly Kumm - whom they failed to call at trial - attaches a
hearsay credit report contended to be of July 29, 1999. Appellants' Brief, p. 24. Besides being
hearsay, the Defendants have done nothing to show an "irregularity in the irialproceedings." The
trial court concluded "there was no misconduct on the part of any Plaintiffs' attorneys nor Plaintiffs

Mr. Kuhn did not commit perjury re: his credit history or any other fact." CR. 866h-866i.
Defendants have not shown abuse of discretion.
The Court further found that Jacqueline Kuhn "to be completely unreliable and
untrustworthy" and based on her Affidavit statements that "if her deposition had been taken...she

would have lied and committed perjury ..." and even if Defendants had asked her to testify she
"would not have returned to Idaho to testify." CR. 866b-866c.

The Court determined in its

discretion that Jacqueline Kuhn's testimony and "the offered evidence" "wouldnot, in this Court's
opinion have changed the result of this trial." CR. 866c.
Plaintiffs Soecifirallv Disclosed the Location of Jacqueline Kuhn
Defendants claim "[olne of the major problems" they "faced at trial was their inability to
produce Jacqueline Kuhn as a witness" as a basis for new trial. Appellantsy Brief, p. 22. But
Jacqueline Kuhn's Affidavit stated she "would not have returned to Idaho totestify" at trial and if
her deposition had been taken she would not have been truthfbl. CR. 561.
Plaintiffsproperly disclosed on July 3 1,2001 Jacqueline Kuhn's address and phone number.
CR. 634, 647. She admitted the contact information provided in July 2001 was correct, and she

moved in November 2001. CR. 561. Defendants for at least 4 months admittedly had her contact
information, and provide no facts of a single attempt to contact her -despite their duty to provide
this Court with the facts to support their position. Rule 35(a)(6), IAR. Defendants even disclosed
her as a defense witness on October 2,2002, but she had never been "asked to testify at trial" even
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as late as January 2,2003. CR. 855. Defendants claim that only after they had already disclosed
her as a trial witness on October 2 they then demanded supplementation of discovery responses on
October 4, 2002. Appellants' Brief, p. 23. Defendants now want to blame their own lack of
diligence on Plaintiffs. See CR. 855, n3.
The trial court found "no misconduct "by Plaintiffs' attorneys nor Plaintiffs." CR. 866h.
There Was No "Newly Discovered Evidence"
Defendants claim error is denying a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(4). Appellants' Brief,
p. 24.

Rule 59(a)(4) allows for a new trial upon "Newly discovered evidence, material for the party

making the application, which theparty could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial." Defendants did not file the requisite Rule 59(a)(4) affidavit with the motion
as required - and as stated above.
Such evidence must have "been discovered since the trial" and "could not have been
discovered before or during ...the trial by the exercise of due diligence."' ldaho Judicial Council
v. Becker, 122 ldaho 288,295,834 P.2d 290; 297 (1992).

The entirety of Defendants' Rule 59(a)(4) argument relates to a claim that "Darren Kuhn hid
Jacquie's whereabouts from the defendants" and concluding without facts that "[dlue diligence
would not have found this witness prior to trial" and that "Jacquie's whereabouts were kept from
Defendants." Appellants' Brief, p. 25. This argument is false and misleading. There was no
hiding as shown in the prior two pages.
Judge McDennott noted Jacqueline Kuhn's affidavit stated she would not have come to Idaho
to trial and otherwise would have perjured herself in a Montana deposition. CR. 866b-c.
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There Was No Error In Law
Defendants claim three errors of law requiring anew trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7): (1) "not
applying the Statute of Frauds to the Respondents' claim that the parties entered into an agreement
whereby Defendants would buy Mt. Park if it had not sold within one year", (2) "allowing Plaintiffs
to call an expert witness to discuss whether the Defendants' conduct was in violation of the
appropriate standard of care" and (3) "not allowing Defendants to testify as to statements made to
them by Jacqueline Kuhn." AppellantsyBrief, p. 26-27. None of these are supported by credible
facts or law as previously set forth herein.
Defendants claim the trial court erred in "not applying the Statute of Frauds to the
Respondents' claim that the parties entered into an agreement whereby Defendants would buy Mt.
Park if it had not sold within one year." AppellantsyBrief, p. 26-27. Defendants' argument fails
for at least three reasons. First, Defendants' conduct was found to be "an extreme deviation from
reasonable standards of conduct and performed with fraud, wantonness, or gross negligence
regarding" Plaintiffs. CR. 312. A person who misrepresents the requirements of the statute of
frauds have been met, is liable for the consequences of that misrepresentation. Placer Energy
Corp.

v. E & S Oil Co., 692 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App. Ft. Worth 1985).
Additionally, the "admission of a contract during the course of litigation will prevent the

defense of statute of frauds." Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods,
135 ldaho 485, 20 P.3d 21 (Ct. App. 2001). A mutually acknowledged contract is not subject

to the statute of frauds. Kelly v. Hodges, 119 ldaho 872, 811 P.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1991). The
trial testimony of Darren Kuhn was that Ron Bitton told him Kelly Fisher had signed the contract
to purchase the Mountain Home property if it did not sell within one year:
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A. I said, well, I still need to know for sure that Kelly has signed the agreement with
my attorney, and he said, "Well, let's call Kelly up. I think he's still in the building.
We'll call him up and see."
And he picked up the phone and he calls Kelly and he says -- all I hear is -Q. Well, wait a minute. Let's back up. He picks up the phone and he calls
somebody?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you bear him say? Are you on a speaker phone?
A. No.
Q. So what do you hear him say in your presence?
A. I hear him say, "Kelly, this is Ron. I have the Kuhns here with me; they have
come in to sign." He says, "They want to know if you've signed the agreement with
their attorney." And I hear him say, "You have? Okay, good. I'll tell them." Then
be hangs up and he says, "Kel&says he has signed the agreement and we're good
to go," and so, with that, I signed thepapers.

- Tr 1429:13-1430:13(Kuhn)

This is an admission against interest and came in without objection at trial. To the extent that
Defendants claim some prior or subsequent objection, they waived that objection where they did not
object:
If the trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial, no
fixther objection is necessary in order to preserve the issue for appeal. If the trial
court does not do so, however, then theparty opposing the evidence must continue
to object as the evidence is presented. St. Alphonsus Diversifled Care v. MRI
Assocs., LLP, 2009 Ida. LEXIS 198 (Id. Sup. Ct. 10-21-09).

Finally, "an exception exists where the party seeking enforcement can show part performance
consistent with the asserted contract, LC. $9-504." Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho 993,1000,895
P.2d 594, 601 (Ct. App. 1995). Dmen Kuhn testified he signed on assurances the Exhibit 32

Agreement was signed. Tr 1429:13-1403:13(Kuhn).
The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.

-
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Damages
- Were Not Due to Passion or Preiudice

Defendants argue the trial court erred in not granting a new trial for excessive or inadequate
damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Appellants'
Brief, p. 27-28.

Where the contention is that the award is so great as to appear to have been given by
jurors activated by passion or prejudice, a more narrow question is presented within
the confines of a Rule 59(a)(5) motion, and the question to be answered is nof one
of law, "since the Idaho cases make plain that the trial judge is not restricted 'as a
matter of law' in considering excessive verdicts." The question is answered only by
a weighing of the evidence, and considerations of doing substantialjustice.

- Dinneen v. Finch, 100 ldaho 620, 623,603 P.2d 575, 578 (1979)

When the trial court grants one of these [59(a)] motions, it should state its reasons
with particularity unless it is obvious from therecord itself. Whereas, if the trial court
simply denies the motion, it need only state, or point to where in the record it reveals,
that the moving party has failed to meet its burden to justify granting the motion.
-Quick

v. Crane, 111 ldaho 759,773,727 P.2d 1200,1214 (1986)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion and went farther then Crane required:
The Court finds in weighing the evidence that there would not have been such a
disparity between what the Court would have awarded and what was awarded by the
Jury to be so great that the difference could only be explained that the jury's award
was based on passion, prejudice or that it would have shocked the conscience of the
Court. - CR. 8661
The Evidence Was Sufficient

Defendants argue it was an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6),
wherein "the trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by the
evidence or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence."
Appellants' Brief, p. 30. The district court has "broad discretion" because it " is in a far better

position to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses." Craig Johnson Constr.,
L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 ldaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648,651 (2006).
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Defendants' only argument, not cited to anypart of the record is that "[tlhe damages were
caused when the Scheis quit paying their lease payments and Kuhn failed to make his mortgage
payments." Appellants' Brief, p. 31. Defendants provide no citation or other argument or facts

as required by Rule 35(a)(6), IAR and this argument is thus waived.
The trial court properly "reviewed all the evidence and testimony of the witnesses was
offered to the jury..." and found "sufficient evidence of quantity, quality, and probative value that
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the jury." CR. 866 9-h.
There Was No Fraud to Set Aside the Judgment
Defendants claim the trial court erred in denying the Defendants' motion to set aside for fraud
under Rule 60(b)(3). Appellants' Brief, pp. 31-34. This "is addressed to the sound legal
discretion of the trial court... burden is on the moving party to establish such fraud by clear and

convincing evidence." Lisher v. Krasselt, 96 ldaho 854,857, 538 P.2d 783,786 (1975).
Defendants conclude "There is no question that Darren Kuhn committed perjury, hid
evidence and information about a material witness, and hid information about his credit rating."
Appellants' Brief, p. 33 (citing to prior discussion). The trial court concluded "there was no

misconduct on the part of any Plaintiffs' attorneys nor Plaintiffs . . . Mr. Kuhn did not commit
perjury re: his credit history or any other fact." CR. 866h-866i. Additionally "Perjury of a witness
is not the type of fraud giving rise to relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)." Roberts v. Bonneville County,
125 ldaho 588,593,873 P.2d 842,847 (1994).

"To relieve a party from a judgment is a most unusual remedy.... available only rarely" and
"will lie only in the presence of extremefraud. Absent overreaching, the burden is on the claimant

toprove each element offraud by clear and convincing evidence." Golder v. Golder, 110 ldaho
57, 59, 714 P.2d 26, 28 (1986). Defendants "facts" have not shown each element of fraud let
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alone by "clear and convincing evidence"; nor have they "overcome the strongpublicpolicy infavor
of thefinali@ of verdicts." Roberts v. Bonneville County, 125 ldaho 588,593,873 P.2d 842,
847 (1994).

POINT FOUR
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
"Trial courts have broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial, and their decision
to admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion."
Karlson v. Harris, 140 ldaho 561, 564, 97 P.3d 428,431 (2004).

The Court Properlv Refused Exhibit GG and Les Lake Testimonv
Defendants assert error in the "exclusion of the testimony of Les Lake," a former Idaho Real
Estate Commission employee who did a cursory "investigation" on a complaint made by the Scheis
against DefendantsMerzlock,Fisher, andBohnandwrote aletter, Defendant's Exhibit GG, stating
he found no wrongdoing. Appellants' Brief, p. 37. Mr. Lyons represented to the Court that Mr.
Lake had "notes of his telephone communications" that were part of his "investigation." Tr
3098:21-23. But Mr. Lake testified he had neither the file nor a copy of "any of it." Tr 3104:2-4;
3103:3-6; 3102:21-25.

By its own terms the Exhibit GG letter was not admissible; it specifically stated it could not
be used to "affectany civil remedies available" to the Scheis. Exhibit 00, line 18. It also stated

"You may or may not have civil recourse against one or more of the persons involve8 and
encouraging them to "contact your attorney." Exhibit 00.
Defendants did not dispute that Mr. Lake was called for the "the sole purpose" of offering
into evidence his conclusory no-violations letter. Exhibit 0 0 :
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MR. H A W S : Your Honor, we believe that the witness is called for the sole
purpose of getting into evidence aletter he authored about which we have previously
talked. Tom, could you help me and identify just what number that letter is.
MR. LYONS: Double G.
MR. H A W S : Thank you. Tr 3081:18-25; Exhibit GG
When pressed by the Court- "what do you want to ask him here? ( ~ 3097:23)
r
-Mr.
Lyons responded "what he looked at and then, finally, the procedure" (Tr 3098:l-2) and to then
have Mr. Lake testify to his "conclusion that there were no violations of the Idaho Real Estate
License Law." Tr 3099:l-2.
Exhibit GG was specifically not admissible under IRE Rule 803(8)(D) because it was an
administrative "investigative" report:
(8) Public records and reports. * * * The following are not within this exception
to the hearsay rule:(D) factual findings resulting from special investigation of a
particular complaint, case, or incident, except when offered by an accused in a
criminal case. - Rule 803(8)(D), Idaho Rules of Evidence
Ignoring the Rule, Defendants argue the objection to Mr. Lake and Exhibit GG was
"convoluted" and "There is no justi$cation for not allowing Mr. Lake to testify" rather flagrantly
misstating the record in claimingthe trial court "never really gave its reasoning" for disallowing Mr.
Lake. Appellants' Brief, p. 37-38. The only cite to support those contentions is a single page of
trial transcript, page 3 108,that has nothing to do with Judge McDermott7s"reasoning" for excluding

Mr. Lake. Appellants' Brief, p. 38.
The objection to Mr. Lake and Exhibit GO was not "convoluted." It specifically stated the

IRE Rule 803(8)(D)prohibition on evidenceof administrative"investigations" in civil cases as made
clear in Jeremiah v. Yanke Machine Shop, 13 1 Idaho 242,953 P.2d 992 (1998). That is in the record
but not referenced by Appellants. Tr 3080:15-3109:2.

-
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That subparagraph "D" Your Honor, under Rule 803(8) does not exist in the
Federal Rules of Procedure. Specifically, then, it's been adopted into law toprevent
exactly what's being attempted here-somebody who has come in, who has done,
maybe, a partial investigation and attempts to put his opinion before the jury so
that they can hopefully gain some momentum with it and move on. It is a specific
proceeding [ s h "provision"] that precludes, for instance, our offering in evidence the
investigative
- reports on a traffic accident. The case law in Idaho is clear. We have
at least one case that has specifically upheld that provision as meaning exactly what
it says, and that's Jeremiah versus YankeeMachineShop. That is a 1998 decision,
131idaho 242,953 P2d 992. It's on page 247 of the 1daho reports that it addresses
that provision. It says it means what it means.

- Tr 308225-3083:l-18

Appellants' brief fails to disclose the above hearing transcript referencing the specific
inadmissability of the Exhibit GG letter under IRE Rule 803(8) and Jeremiah v. Yanke Machine
Shop, 131 Idaho 242,953 P.2d 992 (1998).

Defendants' brief incorrectly argues that Kuhn's objection "changed from hearsay issues to
arguing that he did not know to what Mr. Lake would be testifying" citing to page 3 104 of the trial
transcript. Appellants' Brlef, p. 38. Again, not true. Page 3 104 does not reflect any "change" of
position; it simply adds to the reasons for which IRE Rule 803(8)(D) exists
Judge McDermott specifically pointed out where Exhibit GG was specifically not admissible,
Rule 803(8)(D) could not be circumvented by allowing Mr. Lake to repeat what was in the letter:
THE COURT: Okay. And then he also says in his letter here, though, you may or
may not have several recourse against one or more of the other persons involved.
Basically, contact your lawyer ...I just don't believe this testimony is relevant
whether he did this investigation,and he makes a recommendation, and then another
bureaucrat looks at it and they make a recommendation - or investigator looks at it
- however you want - whatever phraseology you want to use, and then they decide
to not take any action against the licenses of these gentlemen. * * * Ithinkthis is why
the Rule says that factual finding resulting 3 0 m a special investigation in a
particular complaint, case, or incident are not admissible. So if the report is not
admissible, I would think his testimony is not admissible either for the same
reasons... .- Tr 3099:7-3100:l

***

THE COURT: Now, nothingpersonalagainstyou, okay, I'mjust trying tofollow the
rules here, and so -- you won't be allowed to testify. - Tr 3108:2135

-
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No Offer of Proof
There was No Proffer As to Anv Jacqueline Jordan Testimony
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected, and ... (2) In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked." Rule 103(a)(2), IRE.
Defendants argue that "it was error to not allow witnesses to testify as to statements made
by Jacquie Jordan, as an agent of Plaintiff." The transcript is devoid as to what she would have
testified to at trial and Defendants claim if the statements made in "her affidavit" were allowed they
are statements of an agent of PlaintiffDarren Kuhn. Appellants7Brief, p. 37. Defendants cite Mr.
Kuhn's testimony at pages 35-37 of their brief erroneously concluding that Jacqueline Kuhn was
Darren Kuhn's agent for signing Exhibits 5,6, and 7. Mr. Kuhn testified he never would have given
"Todd Bohn authority to create an apartment lease" and that he did not consent to the lease nor ratify
Bohn's signing the lease. (Tr 1375:9-13; 1376:7-12) and that Jacqueline Kuhn did not have
authority to bind Darren Kuhn in any real estate transaction without written permission. Coppedge
v. Leiser, 71 Idaho 248,251,229 P.2d 977 (1951).

POINT FIVE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER
Defendants claim the trial court erred in "not allowing a jury instruction with regard to the
statute of frauds." AppellantsvBrief, p. 39. A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar

-
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conclusionto that ofthejury. VanderfodCo. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,552,165 P.3d 261,
266 (2007). Defendants' argument is limited to this instruction affecting the "breach of contract."
Appellants' Brief, p. 39. This argument is not raised as to Defendants' breach of fiduciary duty,

negligence, and conduct that was an extreme deviation from standards of reasonable conduct as all
found by the jury. CR. 307-313.
The trial court did not e n in refusing a statute of frauds instruction. There was no need to
give an instruction because of the admission of aparty opponent, Fisher, based upon the Ron Bitton
telephone conversation wherein Mr. Bitton testified that Mr. Fisher had signed the contract. Tr
1430-1431. This is discussed previously in POINT FOUR above.

Defendants also argue the "special verdict form provided by the court to the jury in this
matter is convoluted and confusing. ..it allows for double recovery." Appellants' Brief, p. 40. But
that "convoluted and confbsing" objection was not made at trial, only raising the issue of
apportionment. Tr 369Sl4-3696:21. Coldwell Banker was bound by its agents, "if either is liable,
both are equally liable". See Jury Instructions 20.22; CR. 336-338. Finally, these "Special
Verdict" issues do not point to any cite in the record regarding raising this issue below as required
by Rule 35(a)(6), IAR.Defendants have not demonstrated any "double recovery" damage award in
the "Special Verdict." Nor did they make that argument below. Tr 369S14-3696:21.

POINT SIX
ATTORNEY FEES WERE PROPER
While Defendants claim there was no contractual basis for attorney fees, and that the
"amount" awarded is "wholly unreasonable" they provide no cite to the transcript or record below
where these issues were raised. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 41-43. A "party's failure to object to

-
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action by the trial court precludes a party from challenging that action on appeal." Mackowiak v,
Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.3d 504 (2009). Additionally, because Defendants "failed

entirely to support [their] argument with citations to any evidence in the record or relevant legal
authority, this Court declines to review the argument." Michalk v. Michalk, 2009 Ida. LEXlS
191, 13 (Id. Sup. Ct. 10-20-09).

The trial court properly awarded fees to Plaintiff Kuhn based a contract, upon Exhibit 4A,
722 of the parties' Exclusive Buyer Representation Agreement. CR. 866k. Thetrial court properly
awarded fees to Scheis based upon contract - Exhibit 1, 722 of the parties' Exclusive Seller

Representation Agreement -as well as Idaho Code $12-120(3). CR. 866m. Defendants have not
challenged Scheis' statutory award of fees on appeal.

Pees Were Reasonable
Defendants further argue that the fees of "Mr. Hawkes and Mr. Rammel are duplicative and
unreasonable" again without any citation to fact or law. Defendants ignore the uncontradicted
Affidavit of Lowell N. Hawkes. that "The demands of this case were such that I would have needed
assistance from someone else if Mr. Rammell had not been available. As such his assisting role with
me was similar to the assisting defense role of Tom Lyons to David Nye." CR. 438. The Trial
Court agreed:

"Mr. Hawkes' preparation of witnesses and exhibits was exemplary. This Court has
carefully reviewed the Affidavit of Attorney Hawkes in support of attorney fees and
concludes same is accurate, reasonable, and fair given the complexity of this case" and
awarding "$64,242.50" plus "paralegal assistance" of $700.00.

***

"Mr. Rammel did considerable work on this case prior to the lawsuit being filed, after
he was disqualified"and "he continued to perform work for Plaintiff by assisting Mr.
Hawkes in preparation and during trial" and found $82,275 to be "fair given his
experience, the complexity of this case, time required and prevailing charges for like
work."

***

-
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In considering Plaintiff Schei's request for attorney fees this Court has considered.
. . the Affidavit of Mr. Reece in support of attorney fees. This Court concludes that
the hourly rate and time devoted to this case by Mr. Reece was reasonable.

- CR. 8661-866n

The awarding of attorney fees and costs and determination of reasonable fees are within the
discretion of the trial court and subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Mitton, 140
ldaho 893,897,901,104 P.3d 367,371 (2004)

Defendants argue that the amounts awarded were unreasonable merely citing to difference
charged by Mr. Reece and Mr. Rammel. Appellants' Brief, p. 43. Defendants' argument fails to
provide any legal or factual citation, and is thus waived and cannot be cured in a reply brief.
Gallagher v. State, 141 ldaho 665,669,115 P.3d 756,'760 (2005).

As to Mr. Rammel being disqualified because he was a potential witness, he was only
disqualified pursuant to Rule 3.7, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, "as advocate at trial" not
from assisting in the trial which he did.

POINT SEVEN
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs request an award of costs and fees on appeal pursuant to contract, Idaho Code 5
12-120(3) 12-121 and Rule 40, Idaho Appellate Rules.
Plaintiff Kukn seeks fees pursuant to his Exclusive Buyer Representation Agreement:

In the event either party shall initiate any suit or action or appeal on any matter
relating to this Agreement the defaulting party shall pay the prevailing party all
damages and expenses resulting from the default, including all reasonable attorney
fees and all court costs and other expenses incurred by the prevailing party.

- Exhibit 4A, page 2, paragraph 22

Scheis seek attorney fees pursuant to their Exclusive Seller Representation Agreement:

-
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In the event either party shall initiate any suit or action or appeal on any matter
relating to this Agreement the defaulting party shall pay the prevailing party all
damages and expenses resulting from the default, including all reasonable attorney's
fees and all court costs and other expenses incurred by the prevailing party. Exhibit 1; page 2, paragraph 22

The entire case hinges upon the transactions associated with those two Agreements.
Plaintiffs also seek fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-120(3).
In the present case, the gravamen of this lawsuit was a commercial transaction;the
alleged breach of a construction contract between Ervin and the Van Ordens.

- Ervin Constr. Co.

v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695,704,874 P.2d 506 (1993)

Additionally, Plaintiffs seek fees pursuant to Idaho CodeJ12-121, because thejury's verdict

was supported by substantial evidence, and the Defendants' brief essentially asked this Court to
second guess factual determinations, Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,133 P3d 1211 (2006);
disregarded the "the plainly governing civil rule" IRE Rule 803(8)(D) as to the exclusion of Exhibit
GG and Les Lake, asserted errors without any reasoned argument or authority supporting such

assertions KEB v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 101 P.3d 690 (2004).
It is significant that Defendants' brief Statement of the Case fails to cite to anyportion of the
trial transcript facts or trial exhibits. Appellants' Brief, pp 1-2. However, Defendants' brief
admits the Plaintiffs "put on evidence in support of'the allegations of their Complaint. Appellants1
Brief, p 2.

-
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CONCLUSION

The evidence supporting the jury's verdict was substantial; the Verdict was carehlly and
conscientiously rendered. Judgment should be affirmed and Plaintiffs awarded costs and fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5" day of January, 2010
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.

NORMAN G. REECE, P.C.

4iiwt+,&4z)
9.
NORMAN G. REECE, JR.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on January 5,2010 I mailed two copies of Respondents' Brief by U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to Thomas J. Lyons, Menill& Merrill, P.O. Box 991, Pocatello, Idaho, 83204.
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Attachment A
Special Verdict Form
CR. 307-34 3
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FILED
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTFU
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO
The Honorable Peter D. McDermott
. .

. .

DARREN G. KUHN, an individual, SCHEI
)
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. %Q Idaho )
corpomtion, RGGER J. SCHEI: anindividual, )
and FRANCES R. SCI-TEI, an individual,
1

. _.. . , _ . . .

1

.

_ I. .

,

Case No. CVOC-00-02226A

1
PlaintifFs,

)

SPECIAL VERDICT P O W

1
VS.
COLDV4ELL RANKER REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, a New Jersey Corporation,
et af

)
)
)

1
Dzfendmts.
)

nC7
$Q

7rxle,theju;y, answer the questions submitied to us in tbe special verdict as
!c:lvn~s:

QUESTFON NO. 1: Did one o: more Defendants breach a il6uciary duty. which
.xas a proxima::

&use of damzg:(s) to Dmen Kuhn?
,

..

. .

...:,
.....

.,

Answm: yes&

,

No-.

:.

.

...
..
.. .i
.
,,QUECSTX@NNO. k:&Wefind that the f o l l ~. .,...% ~ : ~ ~ f i n ~ . . 4 3 r k %
i7digk.i
h r : d . a..

duty, which was a proximate calise of danlage(sj to Darren Kuhn:
(a) The Defendant Todd Bohn

Answer: Y e s X No-.

(b) The Defendazt John Merzlock

Answer: ~ e s Mxo-.

(c) The Defendant Kelly Fisher

Answer: Y e s X No-.

(d) The Defendant Ron Ritton

Answer: ~ e s No-.
d

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM -Page 1
Strhn v. Coldwell Sanker, er a1

d o7

.

..

'

QUESTION NO. 3: Did one or more Defendants breach a fiduciary
duty which was.a proximate cause of damage(s) to Roger or Frances Schei, or Schei

1

,i

Development Company?
Answer: ~ e s No-.
x

QUESTION NO. 4: We find thaf the follooving Defendants breached a fiduciary
duty, which was a proximate cause of dawge(s) to Roger or Frances Schei, or Schei
~eve1'opment~ o m ~ a n y :
(a) The Defendant Todd Bohn

Answer: Y e s 2 No-.

(b) The Defendant John Mealock

Answer: Y e s A No-.

(c) The Defendant Kelly Fisher

Answer: Y e s A No-.

(d) The Defendant Ronald Bitton

Answer: Yes- 3 No-.

QUESTION KO. 5: Was there negligence on the part ofthe Defendant Todd
. .

-Bohn, which was a proximate cause of damage(s) suffered by one or more of the Plaintiffs?
Answer: Yes&

-

No-.

QmSTION NO. 6: Was there negligence on the part of the DefendcutJohn
Merziock, which was a proximate cause of damage(s) suffered by one or more of the Plaintiffs?
hswer: yes)(

..

No-.

QUESTiON NO. 7: Was therenegligeace on the part ofthe Defendant Kelly
.Fisher, which was a proximate cause of damage(s) suffered by one or more of the PbhtiEs?

.

.

..,\.* ,

.....,,x.
..

...

,

. , ,... .,
. .;::,,.-,..,.,.. ' , :

:..

&=-

-

-ye
. sx.:No
'' '

-.

QUESTION NO. 8: Was there negligence on the part of the Defendant Ronald
Bitton, which was a proximate cause of damage(s) suffered by one or more of the Plaintiffs?
Answer: Yes)(

No-.

QUESTION NO. 9: Was there negligence on the part of Plaintiff Danen G.

Kuhn which was a proximate cause of the damages suffered by Danen C. Kuhn?

-
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,

.

x

Answer: Yes -No-.

QUESTION NO. 10: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs Roger J.
Schei or Frances Schei which was a proximate cause of the damages suffered by Roger 3. Scbei
or Frances Schei?

Y . -.

Answer: Yes -No

QUESTION NO. 11: We find that the following parties.contributed to the cause
of the Plaintiff Dmen G. .Kuhn's damages in the following. percentages :

5.5%

(a) The Defendant Todd Bohn
(h) The Defendant John Merzlock

15%

(c) The Defendant Kelly Fisher

J0%

(d) The Defendant Ronald Bitton

b%

(e) Bron Rammell

1

.

.

3

( f ) The Plaintiff Darren G. Kuhn

.--.
--

%
% .

-

.

100%
i

The total percentage must equal 100%.

QUESTION NO. 12: We find that the following parties contributed to the cause
of the Plaintips Roger Schei, Frances Schei, or Schei Development Company's damages in the
.,.

.'

'

folloy@g percmtagesr
fa) 7he Defendant Todd Bohn

.

'..,. .
.

;. . , ,

;:;* .

"",, . .

.

..c;.I@)Tf,i3'Def&t'Jo&

.

-

Mdocfr

(c) The Defendant Kelly Fisher
(d) The Defendant Ronald Bitton
(e) The Plaintiffs Roger Schei or Frances Schei

.3u% 37:.:./.
.-

'20%

CG.%
7

%

The totaI percentage must equal 100%.
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-...
7

-

,

QUESTION NO. 13: What damages are to be awarded toplaintiff, Darren G.
i

. ..

Kuhn for breach of fiduciary duty and/or the negligence 0fDefendant.s T6dd ~ o ~ m l ~ a h n

;
,

MerzlocW Kelly Fisher/Coldwell Banker?
Answer: $

3~5y.00
:,

i

QUESTIONNO. 14: a

t damages are to be awarded to Plaintiff, Darren G.

Kuhn for breach of fiduciary duty andlor the negligence of Defendants Ron BittodProfess.ional
Escrow Services?
Answer: $ ~

.DoI
L L

.

.

QUESTION NO. 15:. What damages are to be awarded to P1aintiffs;Roger
.

,

Schei, Frances Schei or Schei Development Company for breach of fiduciary d u andlor
~
the

.
Fisher/Coldwell Banker?
negligence of Defendants Todd BohnJJohn. MerzlockKelly
C

,.

j\

~ n s w e r : $ q"7

,540.00

.

QUESTION NO. 16: What damages are to be awarded to Plaintiffs; Roger
Schei, Frances Schei or Schei Developmerft Company for breach of fiduciary.&rltpandlor the
negligeme of Defendants Ron BittodProfessional Escrow Services?
Answer. $
.

.
,

.

..',

. ,......

I

,,

... .

.

..

.

3 , ( j 4 3 , 00

'

QUESTION NO. 17: We find thal one or more of the followjng Defendants

breached an express or implied contract with Dairen G. K u h which was a proximate cause of
3ii'Y dania@ t d m e n G j . K h * ' .. .
&.

(a) The Defendant Todd Bohn

~ n s w e r y: e s

(b) The Defendant John Merzlock

Answer: yes??

No-.

(c) The Defendant Kelly Fisher

Answer: yes&

No-.

(d) The Defendant Ron Binon

Answer: Yes- X No-.
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NO-.

.

.

QUESTION NO. 18: We find one or more of the following Defendants breached
a n express or implied contract with Roger and Frances Schei, which was the proximate cause of
I

any damages to Roger and Frabces S&ek
(a) The Defendant
.
..

. . .

.

.. .

iI

odd Bohn

Answer:

YEANo-.

i

%

J

(b) Tne Defendant John Merzixk

Answer. Yes-

No-

(c) Tke Defendant Kelly Fisher

Answer: Yes- X No-.

(d)The Defendant Ron Bitton

Answer: ~ e s No-.
x

QUESTION NO. 19: We find the Plaintiff Danren G. Kuhn is entitled to
damages against each of the following Defendants for breach of express or implied contract:.
(a) The Defendants Todd Bohn, John Merzlock, Kelly Fisher

124j4~q,C0
Answer: $
4 GsL.OD
Answer:$

(b) The Defendant Ron Bitton
. .

QUESTION NO. 21)I. We find the Plaintiffs Roger or Frances Schei or Schei

\!

Development Company are entitled to damages against each of the following ~efendantsfor
breach of express or implied contract:

I

(a) The Defendants Todd Bohn, John Merzlock, Kelly Fisher

,

-*

.,.

. :
. . . ..

(b) The Defendant Ron Bitton .

.. ,

,

,

QUESTION;%O; ?frr: Pxe R

~

Answer: $

.

...

'

2 6 , q(-/&,a

.

~

~

. $!fid:Gf
~
~~

f i

~

F

real estate commission they paid to Coldwell Banker regarding the sale of Manning Lane; if so,
what amount?
Answer:$
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QUESTION NO. 22: Were Defendant Todd Bohn's actions an extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct and were they performed with fraud,
wantonness, or gross negligenceregard'ing Dm& G . . l h h ?

',

.

.

.

. .

Answer: yes)(
NO-.
QUESTION NO. 23: Tere Defendant John Merzlock's actions an extreme
.

.

deviation from reasonable standards of conduct and were they performed.with fraud,
,.

>

wantonness, or gross negligence regarding Darren G. Kuhn?
Answer:, Yes

A No-,

QUESTION NO. 24: Were Defendant Coldwell Banker's actions an extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct and were they performed.with fraud,
wantonness, or gross negligence regarding Darren G. Kuhn?
Answer: yes

. .

NO

-.

QUESTION NO. 25: Were Defendant Todd Bohn's actions'an extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct and were they performed with fraud,
wantonness, or gross negligence regardinggoger and Frances Schei?
Answer: yes)(

NO-.

QUESTION NO. 26: Were Defendant John Merzlock's actioils an extreme
deviation from reasonabIe sbndards of conduct and were they performed with fraud,
.- wantonness, or gross negligence regarding Roger and Frances Schei?
. ,.

..&..

>

,,:

.-

. ,'

, .
. ..

.

.
,.. .,:.,

., .~2:j;rc:;rAnssla$Nes~i2~~~>,~o

-

QUESTION NO. 27: Were Defendant Coldwell Banker's actions an extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct and were they performed with fraud,
wantonness, or gross negligence regarding Roger and Frances Schei.
Answer: Yes

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM -Page6
Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker, et a1

No -.

QUESTION NO. 28: What amount of punitive damages are awarded to Danen
G. Kuhn as a result of theconduct of: .
.

. . .' .

.

.

.

(a) The Defendant Todd Bohn

(b) The Defendant John Merzlock
,

4i ,dso-6p... . . .
$ b ,% 3%.a

. . . . . . . .-~nswer:
. .
$

Answer:

. .

Answer: $

(c) The Defendant Coldwell Banker

.

:.

S O ~ O Do6D

QUESTION NO. 29: What amount ofpunitive damages 'me awarded to Roger
and Frances Schei or Schei Development Corporation as a result of the conduct of:
(a) The Defendant Todd Bohn
(b) The Defend'ant John Merzlock

(c) The Defendant Coldwell Banker

.
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.

,

~ n s w e r :$

32

Answer: $

41 , 5 3 s . @

S0O;OQ

~ n s w e r :$360?0oC),@

Presiding juror/Foreperson

